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Property rights are increasingly utilized for environmental and resource management: in ﬁsheries these
market-based approaches take the form of individual transferable quotas. This paper studies labor
contracts in ﬁsheries governed by individual transferable quotas (ITQs). Previous literature on labor
contracts in ﬁsheries models the dominance of a share system of remuneration between boat owner and
crew in ﬁsheries. We extend the standard model of the labor contract to the case of ITQ ﬁsheries to
explain the share contract between crew and boat owner and the share contract between boat owner and
quota owner when boat owner, quota owner, and crew are risk averse in a stochastic environment. We
test this model through analysis of the Mid-Atlantic surf clam ﬁshery and present empirical evidence of
changes in contracting practices, harvest rates and shares of crew remuneration.
Ó 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
The persistence of share contracts in agriculture in developing
countries is the focus of substantial economics literature (e.g. Refs.
[3,10]). Fisheries provide a valuable context to examine labor contracting: the output is stochastic by nature, the labor efforts are
usually unobservable, and total output is a product of joint effort.
Worldwide, the dominant form of payment to ﬁshery labor is
a share system, in which a portion of the revenue or proﬁt is paid to
the crew in lieu of a ﬁxed wage [26]. Across ﬁsheries, the form of
the crew share system varies between a share of gross revenues
only or a share of net proﬁt after deducting speciﬁed variable costs,
and the share system exists in ﬁsheries regardless of the degree of
economic development [19]. It has been shown that when the boat
owner and crew members are risk averse in a stochastic environment, crop sharing is the optimal contract, and will produce
a higher effort level than a wage contract (see Refs. [32,1,27]).
Previous literature on the share system has focused on its
optimality over a wage system in ﬁsheries. Given the increasing
emphasis on the use of market mechanisms for resource management in developed and developing countries, a central question is
whether the crew share system will continue and whether crew
shares (and hence expected incomes of ﬁshing communities) will
decrease [24,25,17]. Hannesson [14] models the effect of a share
system on the level of investment in capital under ITQs and
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investment with optimal management, while Grafton has noted
that the use of the share system may be replaced with either a wage
or ﬁxed rate payment [12,11]. However, there is no detailed treatment of the change in the share system itself after introducing ITQs.
Command-and-control regulation in ﬁsheries, which has been
criticized for inducing serious economic inefﬁciencies, safety
hazards, and ecosystem damage, is often blamed for creating the
classic ‘‘race for ﬁsh’’ [12,24].2 By contrast, in ﬁsheries managed
with individual transferable quotas (ITQs), the ﬁsherman has
a guaranteed proportion of the total allowable catch (TAC), and can
harvest that share throughout the season. There remain, however,
questions about how a ﬁshery will change once ITQs are
implemented.
Of particular concern is the reported practice of reducing the
crew’s share for harvests where the boat owner leases quota to
cover the harvest, a practice for which there is ample anecdotal
evidence. Changes in the form and amount of crew remuneration
have been documented in various ﬁsheries which implemented
ITQs including the surf clam and ocean quahog ﬁshery [21], British
Columbia halibut ﬁshery [5] and a range of Icelandic ﬁsheries
[6,24]. The drop in crew incomes due to this practice under ITQs led
to widespread tensions in Icelandic ﬁsheries [7]. The potential
redistribution of bargaining power between crew and capital
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Perhaps the most dramatic example of the race for ﬁsh is the infamous ‘‘Halibut
Derby’’ in Alaska between 1990 and 1994, during which 24- to 48-h periods of
frantic ﬁshing led to accidents, loss of gear, extreme booms and busts in the supply
of halibut, and ﬁshing-related deaths. Under ITQ management the halibut ﬁshery is
now open from March to November. Similar changes have been reported in the
wreckﬁsh [29,9] and British Columbia halibut ﬁsheries [5].

owners has helped fuel the policy debate over the socioeconomic
impact of ITQs on ﬁshing communities.
In ﬁsheries with ITQs, the ITQ itself is a new form of capital
distinct from the vessel. We designate ﬁrms that own vessels as
‘‘boat owners’’, who may or may not own ITQs. One signiﬁcant
difference between command-and-control and ITQs is that under
ITQs a ﬁrm can sell its vessels but retain its ITQs. A ﬁrm that owns
ITQs but not vessels is still a signiﬁcant capital owner in this ﬁshery
and can lease its ITQs to boat owners. We term this type of ﬁrm
a ‘‘quota owner’’. Markets for leasing quota have been documented
in many ﬁsheries including those in the US [24], Iceland, Netherlands, New Zealand and Canada [15]. In New Zealand, for example,
the number of leases increased from 2000 occurrences in 1986 to
16,000 occurrences in 1998, and there is evidence that the
relationship between quota lease and sale prices reﬂects economically rationale behavior [23]. The individual’s choice between
owning and leasing quota is driven by the relative prices and access
to ﬁnancial capital, and this analysis is left for future research. In
this paper we focus on contracting once the ﬁrm’s portfolio of
owned and leased quota is determined.
In this paper, we explore the optimal ﬁshery contract when
there are three contracting parties: crew, boat owners, and quota
owners. The central contracting party is the boat owner, who
negotiates bilaterally with both quota owner and labor (the crew),
a standard practice in ﬁsheries. We extend the standard model of
labor contracts in ﬁsheries which establishes that crop sharing is
the optimal contract when boat owners and crew members are risk
averse (see Ref. [27]). We maintain the basic features of this model
including the production function for a single-species ﬁshery,
a normally distributed random term, and absence of market power.
We introduce a third contracting party, the quota owner, into the
model to study the impact of ITQ on contracting practices. The focus
of our analysis is on the temporary ownership, i.e. leasing of ITQs,
for two main reasons. First, the leasing of ITQs is a noted innovation
in the ﬁshing industry, which has been observed in many ITQ
ﬁsheries, but not incorporated into the standard models. Second, it
is the impact of this new type of transaction on crew that is of
policy interest. We simplify some of the attributes of the ITQ ﬁshery
to emphasize the basic results of the model, without loss of
generality. We show that when boat owner, quota owner, and crew
member are risk averse in a stochastic environment, the optimal
contract has two components: a crop-sharing contract between
quota owner and boat owner, and crop sharing between the boat
owner and crew. This crop-sharing contract is deﬁned mainly by
two parameters: (1) a ﬁxed rental price q for each unit of quota that
the boat owner rents from the quota owner at the very beginning of
the year; and (2) a share rate a of output price paid by the boat
owner to the quota owner for each unit of quota which is rented
and actually used during the year.
The negotiation between boat owner, crew and quota owner is
modeled in Section 2, and the crew’s choice of effort under varying
contracts is modeled in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 test this model
through analysis of the Mid-Atlantic surf clam ﬁshery; Section 4
describes some of the shifts in the usage of capital and employment
of labor brought about by ITQs in this ﬁshery, and Section 5
presents empirical evidence of changes in contracting practices and
harvest rates.
2. Share contracting in ITQ ﬁsheries
Assume that at the very beginning of the year, after investigating
the market demand for the output, the boat owner makes a plan for
how much he is going to harvest (H) in the year. Crew members are
paid a share of the harvest instead of a wage rate. If the quota he
owns (qb) is less than the amount he plans to harvest, the boat
owner has to rent the remaining quota from the quota owner

(H  qb). Since there is an uncertainty (m) associated with the
harvest due to stochastic elements including the weather and
biological parameters, it is possible for the boat owner to lease
more ITQs than needed.
We assume that in addition to a ﬁxed rental price q for each unit
of quota rented – no matter whether or not it is actually used
during the year – the boat owner also pays a share (a) of output
price (P) to the quota owner for each unit of rented quota that is
actually used (mH  qb) during the year. These two components
form the income of the quota owner, but represent a variable cost
for the boat owner. The boat owner then shares the realized
revenue and this variable cost with the crew by choosing the share
rate (r). The variables used in the model are listed below.
P

m

H
L
X
qb
r

q
a
bb
bq
bc
d
M
W
FC

price of output
random term associated with the output where E[m] ¼ 1
and Var½m ¼ s2m . Demand, production, or both can be
considered as random.3
output, a function of effort level and stock of ﬁsh
effort level
stock of ﬁsh
boat owner’s own quota
crew share of revenue and cost
ﬁxed price paid by the boat owner to the quota owner for
each quota unit rented
share of output price paid by the boat owner to the quota
owner for each quota unit rented and actually used
boat owner’s distaste for income variability
quota owner’s distaste for income variability
crew’s distaste for income variability
annual rate of return on investment in quota from selling
quota
per-unit sale price of quota
opportunity cost per unit of effort by the crew
ﬁxed costs

The income (I) and utility (U) functions of the quota owner, boat
owner and crew are described in Sections 2.1–2.3, respectively. The
parameters (bb, bc, bq) describe the respective distastes for income
variability of the boat owner, crew, and quota owner. With our
assumption that all contracting parties are risk averse, the parameters (bb, bc, bq) are always larger than 0 but less than 1.
2.1. Quota owner
Recall that we use the term ‘‘quota owner’’ to designate
a ﬁrm that owns quota but not vessels, and such a ﬁrm’s income
has two components. One is the ﬁxed rental price paid by the
boat owner for each unit of quota rented at the beginning of the
year (q(H  qb)). The other is the share of output price paid by
the boat owner (aP) for each unit that is leased and actually used
(mH  qb). The random term (m) enters the second component,
the harvest, but not the ﬁrst, the ﬁxed rental rate. The ﬁrst
component is a payment by the boat owner for the right to use
quota during the season; whether or not he actually uses the
quota, he must compensate the quota owner for its opportunity
cost. But the boat owner only has to share revenue with the
quota owner for those units that are actually used during the
year.

Iq ¼ qðH  qb Þ þ aPðmH  qb Þ

(1a)
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We follow the assumption made by Plourde and Smith [27] about the
distribution of the random term, because we are interested in how the introduction
of ITQs changes the results of the model.

The quota owner is risk averse and has preferences given by the
mean–variance utility function:

 
 
Uq ¼ E Iq  bq Var Iq
¼ aPðH  qb Þ þ qðH  qb Þ  a2 P 2 H2 bq s2m

(1b)

2.2. Boat owner
A boat owner receives income from harvests (H) sold at price P
and pays the crew a share of this revenue (r). If the boat owner
harvests more than the quota owned, then the boat owner must
cover the surplus harvest by leasing quota through a contract with
a quota owner [aP(mH  qb) þ q(H  qb)]. As stated in the introduction, there is evidence that in ITQ ﬁsheries the crew pays a portion of
the cost of leasing quota. The share of the cost of leasing quota that is
not covered by the crew is (1  r). Fixed costs are subtracted from
the boat owner’s income (FC). The boat owner then receives

Ib ¼ ð1  rÞP mH  ð1  rÞ½aPðmH  qb Þ þ qðH  qb Þ  FC

(2a)

Eq. (2a) states that the boat owner’s income is equal to his share of
the realized revenue (after the crew share), minus ﬁxed costs and
his share of variable cost (from leasing quota). The associated
preference function is

Ub ¼ E½Ib   bb Var½Ib 

This constraint states that crew’s utility from participating in this
contract arrangement equals what they could get from their next
best available alternative.
There are four choice variables in this case: effort level (L), ﬁxed
rental price of quota (q), share of output paid to quota owner (a),
and crew share of revenue and variable cost (r). Substituting the
participation constraints (4) and (5) into the boat owner’s utility
function and rearranging yields

Ub ¼ PH  dMðH  qb Þ  WL  FC
h
i
 P 2 H2 s2m a2 bq þ r 2 ð1  aÞ2 bc þ ð1  rÞ2 ð1  aÞ2 bb
The value of a and r that maximizes Ub will be the solution to:

Min D ¼ a2 bq þ r 2 ð1  aÞ2 bc þ ð1  rÞ2 ð1  aÞ2 bb

r* ¼

a* ¼

ð2bÞ

The crew receives a share of the revenue from the harvest
(rPmH). The cost of leasing the ITQs is shared with the crew
(r[aP(mH  qb) þ q(H  qb)]). The crew income is then

(3a)

The expression of the preference function for the crew income
function in Eq. (3a) is

Uc ¼ E½Ic   bc Var½Ic  ¼ r½PH  aPðH  qb Þ  qðH  qb Þ
 r 2 ð1  aÞ2 P 2 H2 bc s2m

ð3bÞ

Below we present the solution to this model, and details are in
the Appendix. The optimization problem is for the boat owner to
maximize his utility (2b) subject to the constraints that both the
quota owner and the crew accept their respective contracts. The
boat owner guarantees a ﬁxed level of utility to the crew and quota
owner to induce them to participate in the contract.
The participation constraint of the quota owner is

(8a)

r 2 bc þ ð1  rÞ2 bb

(8b)

bq þ r2 bc þ ð1  rÞ2 bb

a* ¼

r 2 bc þ ð1  rÞ2 bb

bq þ r2 bc þ ð1  rÞ2 bb

¼

bb bc
bq ðbb þ bc Þ þ bb bc

From this expression, we notice that a* is always between 0 and 1. It
is equal to 0 if and only if bb or bc is zero or both of them are zero –
that is, if the boat owner or crew is risk neutral or both of them are
risk neutral. Since we have assumed that both are risk averse, a*
will not be zero. This implies that whenever production is feasible,
a share contract between boat owner and quota owner is optimal.
Note that the optimal quota share parameter a* and optimal
harvest share parameter r* are both independent of market
variables such as output price and effort level; they are purely
determined by the risk aversion parameters of boat owner, crew,
and quota owner.
Previous literature showed that in a stochastic production
environment share contracts will be optimal.4 The model presented
here extends this result to the case of ITQ ﬁsheries. The results show
in ITQ ﬁsheries, a share contract between crew and boat owner will
persist, and a share contract between boat owner and quota owner
will emerge. This model explains anecdotal evidence of the
emergence of share contracts under ITQs.

3. Crew effort under an ITQ share contract

U q ¼ dMðH  qb Þ ¼ aPðH  qb Þ þ qðH  qb Þ  a2 P 2 H 2 bq s2m
0aPðH  qb Þ þ qðH  qb Þ ¼ a2 P 2 H2 bq s2m þ dMðH  qb Þ

bb
bb þ bc

Substituting r* into Eq. (8b) yields a*:

2.3. Crew

Ic ¼ rP mH  r½aPðmH  qb Þ þ qðH  qb Þ

(7)

The ﬁrst-order conditions of Eq. (7) yield

¼ ð1  rÞ½PH  aPðH  qb Þ  qðH  qb Þ
 FC  ð1  rÞ2 ð1  aÞ2 P 2 H2 bb s2m

ð6Þ

ð4Þ

This constraint states that the contract arrangement should
compensate the quota owner’s opportunity cost of leasing quota.
This opportunity cost is measured by the annual return on investment from selling the quota at the very beginning of the year. There
is no random component because the quota owner loses the ability
to sell the quota, whether or not it is actually used during the year.
The analogous participation constraint of the crew member is

This section compares the crew’s effort level, under a crop share
contract, over trips differentiated by quota ownership: (1) trips
using the boat owner’s own quota, where boat owner and crew
share the gross revenue; and (2) trips with leased quota, where
boat owner and crew share both revenue and the cost of leasing
quota. In this section, we assume a deterministic harvest function
to illustrate the incentives created by share contracts in ITQ
ﬁsheries. The objective is to show how effort level differs between
these two types of trips.

U c ¼ WL ¼ r½PH  aPðH  qb Þ  qðH  qb Þ  r 2 ð1  aÞ2 P 2 H2 bc s2m
0r½PH  aPðH  qb Þ  qðH  qb Þ ¼ r 2 ð1  aÞ2 P 2 H 2 bc s2m þ WL
(5)
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The optimal solution r* (share between boat owner and crew member) to our
model where there are three contracting parties is the same as the optimal solution
r* in Plourde and Smith [27] where there are only two contracting parties including
boat owner and crew member.

3.1. Trips with boat owner’s ITQs
For a given stock of ﬁsh (X) the amount of harvest (H) depends
on the effort level of crew (L). For trips in which the boat owner uses
his own ITQs for the harvest, the utility functions of boat owner and
crew can be expressed as

Ub ¼ PHðL; XÞ  rPHðL; XÞ  FC

(9a)

Uc ¼ rPHðL; XÞ  CðLÞ

(9b)

where C(L) shows the disutility of the crew from effort. As in the
previous section, there is a participation constraint in which the
boat owner guarantees a reservation utility of U to the crew. Then
the boat owner solves

Max Ub ¼ PHðL; XÞ  rPHðL; XÞ  FC

ð10Þ

subject to :
Uc ¼ rPHðL; XÞ  CðLÞ ¼ U
Substituting the constraint into the objective function and solving
the ﬁrst-order condition gives

P ¼

CL
HL

(11)

This equation indicates that the optimal effort level is achieved
when the marginal output value of an extra unit of effort is equal to
the crew’s marginal disutility from that effort. The optimal effort
level, L*, is the solution to this ﬁrst-order condition.
3.2. Trips with leased ITQs
In contrast, for trips where leased quota is used, the utility
functions of boat owner and crew reﬂect that a part of the revenue
from harvests covers the costs of leasing. The utility functions are

Ub ¼ ð1  rÞPHðL; XÞ  ð1  rÞqHðL; XÞ  FC

(12a)

Uc ¼ rPHðL; XÞ  r qHðL; XÞ  CðLÞ

(12b)

Again, we assume that the boat owner guarantees a reservation utility
of U to the crew. The boat owner’s optimal choice problem becomes

Max Ub ¼ ð1  rÞPHðL; XÞ  ð1  rÞqHðL; XÞ  FC

ð13Þ

subject to :
Uc ¼ rPHðL; XÞ  r qHðL; XÞ  CðLÞ ¼ U
The ﬁrst-order condition for this optimization is

Pq ¼

CL
HL

(14)

The optimal effort level, L**, is the solution to the above condition.
To compare the effort level over these two types of trips, we
differentiate CL/HL with respect to L. The standard assumption
about production indicates that H(L,X) is increasing in L and
concave, and C(L) is increasing and convex, which means the
marginal output from effort is decreasing while the marginal
disutility of effort is increasing. That is

HL > 0;

HLL < 0;

CL > 0;

CLL > 0

Based on these assumptions, we can sign the above equation:

vHCLL
vL

¼

CLL HL  HLL CL
>0
HL2

This result indicates that CL/HL is an increasing function of L.

Because CL/HL is increasing over L, and P > P  q, the optimal
effort level in the ﬁrst case (boat owner’s own quota) is higher than
in the second case (leased quota). This is an intuitive result, in that
the crew has to bear its share of the leasing cost in the second case.
Our model of contracting between boat owners and crew makes
three behavioral assumptions that are consistent with the economic
literature. First, crew members have declining utility with respect to
effort. Second, in order to retain crew the contract must provide at
least enough utility as crew would receive in their next best alternative. This participation constraint states that the crew earns at
least their reservation utility of U. Third, the contract offered to the
quota owner must provide at least the minimum utility the quota
owner would receive in their next best alternative. The boat owner
then maximizes his utility subject to these constraints by choosing
three variables: the ﬁxed rental price of a quota, the share of the
harvest paid to the quota owner, and the share of harvest costs
shared by the crew. Conceptually this optimization means that the
boat owner weighs the beneﬁts of passing the cost of leasing the
quota on to the crew with the cost of the reduced crew effort. These
three variables completely describe the contract offered to the crew
who then has one choice variable, the effort level. The ﬁrst-order
condition for the boat owner shows that it is optimal for the boat
owner to accept the lower effort level of the crew, because it allows
the boat owner to pass along the cost of leasing the quota.
There are two critical results from this model. First, under ITQs,
the share system incorporates both the agreement between boat
owner and crew and the agreement between boat owner and quota
owner. Second, because the crew shares the cost of leasing quota,
their incentive is to harvest at a lower rate than on a trip where the
quota is owned by the boat owner. This result is similar to that in
agricultural share contracts [2].
While this model explains why deducting the cost of the leasing
of quota is a stable arrangement in the case of an ITQ ﬁshery, one
could then contemplate if ITQs could create the conditions for
optimality of a wage system instead of the traditional share
system.5 To address this question, one needs to consider the two
modeling perspectives used to explain the share system, risk
sharing [27,32] and moral hazard [13,22], and then ask whether the
introduction of ITQ changes the conditions of these models. In the
case of risk sharing we feel that the change to ITQs is unlikely to
create such a shift to a wage system, because boat owners’
preferences are pre-determined and arguably exogenous to the
regulatory setting. In the moral hazard approach making the crew’s
payment dependent on the harvest addresses the problem that the
crew has the incentive to shirk because his effort is not observed or
veriﬁable. While ITQs may change the pace of harvesting, there is no
evidence that the actual ﬁshing process, or the ability to verify the
effort of individual crew has changed. We therefore conclude that
the introduction of ITQs will change the nature of the share contract
but not the motivation and thus existence of the share system.
4. Case study: Mid-Atlantic surf clam ﬁshery
The theoretical model of ﬁrm contracting explains the share
contract both between boat owner and crew and between boat
owner and quota owner (Eqs. (8a) and (8b)). In addition, the model
of crew behavior in Section 3 indicates that the optimal effort level
on trips with leased quota should be lower than that on trips with
the boat owner’s quota.
We verify these models using evidence gathered by extensive
ﬁeld interviews and harvest data in the Mid-Atlantic surf clam
ﬁshery, which is described in this section. The data used to estimate
the models in this paper are from the National Marine Fishery

(15)
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The authors thank an anonymous reviewer for posing this question.

4.1. Changes in capital utilization
In 1976, the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council
restricted allowable ﬁshing time in the surf clam ﬁshery and
implemented a limited access system. By the mid-1980s, however,
rapid growth in harvesting capacity and resulting inefﬁciencies led
to a proposal to implement a property rights system; from the
mid-1980s to 1988, council meetings were dominated by the
contentious issue of distributing quotas among the industry
participants. The ITQ allocation formula was ﬁnalized in 1988,7 and
the ﬁrst full year of tradable property rights was 1991.
One long-term beneﬁt associated with the ITQ system is the
reduction of excess capital. From Fig. 1, it is evident that the number
of vessels active in harvesting surf clams increased from 1985 to
1990. However, there was a dramatic reduction in the number of
vessels in 1991, falling from 39 in 1990 to 26 in 1991. This reduction
in ﬁshing capital reﬂects a signiﬁcant change in industry structure
resulting from the anticipated policy change. In the years following
1991, the number of vessels continued to slowly decline.
The reduction in capital in the ﬁshery was concurrent with an
increase in time of ﬁshing per vessel. Of the independent vessels
that harvested before and after ITQs, 75% increased their annual
total hours at sea in 1995 compared to that in year 1990. The
percentage increase in time spent at sea ranges from a low of 16% to
a high of 1100%.
4.2. Impact of ITQs on crew
We are speciﬁcally concerned with the impact of this change on
crews and crew contracts. Vessel logbooks record the number of
crew used per ﬁshing trip. By aggregating the number of crew
recorded per vessel, we found that the reduction of vessels in the
ﬁshery signiﬁcantly reduced the total labor employed by the sector.
In 1990, 155 crew members were employed in this sector; this
number fell to 98 in 1993, 83 in 1995, and 34 in 1999. These
numbers reﬂect a dramatic decline in the potential employment for
ﬁshing crew in this sector, due to the consolidation of capital. This is
consistent with our expectation that the total crew in the sector
will be reduced by the introduction of ITQs, since some vessels exit
the market by selling their quota.
Other researchers have posited that those vessels remaining in
the sector could substitute additional ﬁshing time for crew
members, because the elimination of the ‘‘race for ﬁsh’’ creates
more orderly ﬁshing conditions [11]. However, this substitution for
employment was not signiﬁcant in the surf clam ﬁshery; of the 12
vessels that were active in both 1990 and 1995, only one vessel
increased its crew size and the remaining kept crew size constant
over that period.
Under the payment system prior to ITQs, crew members shared
gross revenues with the boat owner, a typical arrangement allotting

6

Compliance with reporting regulations is rated as high [18].
7
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration approved the ﬁnal
version of the tradable property rights program in 1990. See Ref. [16]. The surf clam
allocation included vessel catch (80%) and vessel capacity (20%). For vessels harvesting surf clams, the historical catch was equal to the vessel’s total harvest over
1979–1988 (counting the years 1985–1988 twice and dropping the vessel’s worst 2
years). Each vessel’s catch ratio was the vessel’s historical catch divided by the sum
of all vessels’ historical catch. The vessel’s cost factor was equal to the product of
the vessel’s length, width and volume. The vessel’s cost ratio was equal to the
vessel’s cost factor divided by the sum of the cost factors over all vessels. The
vessel’s initial surf clam allocation, as a percentage of the total harvest, was 0.8
(catch ratio) þ 0.2 (cost ratio).

Number of active
vessels

Service logbook reporting system, which documents every
harvesting trip taken by every vessel.6
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Fig. 1. Active vessels, 1985–1999.

1/3 of the gross revenues to the crew [16]. However, with the
introduction of ITQs, this system changed, with boat owners
generally deducting the cost of leasing quota from the gross
revenues, and then sharing the net revenues with the crew. A
typical arrangement now is for the boat owner to pay half of the
gross revenues to the quota owner, and then share the remaining
half with the crew. In this case, the crew share of net revenues is
still 1/3, but its actual share of gross revenues is reduced to 1/6.
However, if ships spent more time at sea and ITQs increased
ﬁshing efﬁciency, crew members could still be better off under the
new system. Table 1 summarizes the changes in per-vessel crew
payments from 1992 to 1999, relative to the same set of vessels in
1990. The ﬁrst row is the count of vessels operating in that year that
were also operating in 1990. The second row is the count of vessels
whose total crew income in that year was greater than the total
crew payment for the same vessel in 1990. Of the 19 vessels active
in the sector in both 1990 and 1992, crew income from harvesting
surf clams increased in ﬁve vessels and decreased in 14 vessels:
approximately one-quarter of the boats operating in both periods
saw crew payments increase relative to 1990 while three-quarter
saw them decline relative to 1990. By 1999 the proportion of vessels
with total crew payments that were higher than in 1990 had
reached 80%. The mean total payment to crew for harvesting surf
clams was $77,319 in 1990 (standard deviation of $39,441), while
the mean in 1995 was $115,755 (standard deviation of $97,740).8
Standard models of ITQs in ﬁsheries predict a reduction of
overcapitalization, consolidation of capital, and efﬁcient use of
remaining capital. These changes were observed in the surf clam
ﬁshery after the introduction of ITQs. In summary, ITQs produced
a signiﬁcant decrease in capital in the ﬁshery, but an increase in the
mean amount of time vessels spent at sea. For crews, ITQs led to
a reduction in total employment in the ﬁshery, but an increase in
the mean payment for harvesting surf clams.
In addition to the changes predicted by standard models, the
model presented in Sections 2 and 3 predicts changes in
contracting in the ﬁshery. Empirical evidence of these changes is
presented in the next section.
5. Empirical evidence of share contracts
5.1. Emergence of new contractual relationships
This ﬁshery consists of three types of participants: independent
ﬁrms, vertically integrated ﬁrms and horizontally integrated ﬁrms
(for discussion of participant types see Ref. [20]). For our empirical
analysis we considered those vessels owned by independent ﬁrms,
ﬁrms that were neither vertically integrated with the processing
sector nor horizontally integrated with other ﬁshing vessels. In
ﬁeld interviews, participants reported that independent ﬁrms
consistently subtract the cost of a quota only if the quota is owned

8

Total payments in both years are in 1999 real dollars.

Table 2
Descriptive statistics for harvest rates over two types of trips, 1992–1999

Count of vessels
Count of vessels with
higher payments
relative to 1990

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

19
5

16
5

13
6

12
8

9
5

8
5

8
4

5
4

by another distinct ﬁrm. This case of an external contract is
depicted in our model. In contrast, the integrated ﬁrms may deduct
the cost of leasing quota from the boat’s trip under two cases: when
the ﬁrm leases the quota from another distinct ﬁrm (external
contract or lease), or when the quota is owned by the same ﬁrm but
was allocated to a different vessel (internal contract or lease). This
pattern of external (between distinct ﬁrms) and internal (between
units of the same ﬁrm) trades and contracts has been found in
industries in addition to the surf clam ﬁshery [4]. We decided to
limit the analysis to the case of the independent ﬁrms for two
reasons. First, the model of combining external and internal
contracting is sufﬁciently complex to warrant a paper in and of
itself and is left for future research. Second, based on interviews, we
felt conﬁdent that an independent ﬁrm subtracts the cost of leasing
only if there is an external contract. Therefore, without making
assumptions about the unobserved contract (internal or external),
the data available to researchers allow us to identify those trips for
which the price of the quota is deducted in the case of an external
contract by an independent ﬁrm.
Section 2 presents a model that predicts that a share contract
between quota owners and boat owners will emerge in an ITQ
ﬁshery. Extensive interviews of surf clam harvesters revealed that
transactions for surf clam ITQs are often bilateral trades between
industry participants rather than transactions in a standard market.
For transactions between two different ﬁrms (external transactions), contracts specify how the price per bushel of clams is split
between the boat owner and the quota owner, with the boat owner
typically earning 50–60% of the output. For example, if an independent ﬁshing ﬁrm harvests using a quota owned by a clam
processor, the independent ﬁrm receives $5–6 per cage of clams out
of the $10 market price [21,20,28,24]. This type of agreement and its
contribution to disputes over the welfare effects of ITQs has been
documented in other ﬁsheries as well [7].
In addition, our model predicts that boat owners can pass some
of the cost of leasing ITQs onto the crew and still meet the participation constraint. Indeed, empirical evidence shows that by 1994
a majority of harvesting ﬁrms (boat owners) had implemented
a new share system, where the cost of leasing quota was deducted
from gross revenues before sharing with the crew. The following
section compares harvest patterns between the trips with quota
owned by the boat owner’s (own quota) and trips with quota leased
from a quota owner (leased quota), in order to test the model
developed in Section 3. As predicted, trips with the boat owner’s
own quota tend to have a higher effort level than trips with leased
quota.
5.2. Changes in crew effort
Labor effort is a classic case of an unobservable or ‘‘hidden’’
action in a moral hazard problem [30]. In our case the observable
outcome correlated with the effort is the harvest rate. We feel
conﬁdent in comparing harvest rates over trips with owned and
leased quotas for purposes of empirical analysis because (1) the
major capital input, the vessel with its embedded technology, is
unchanged between trips; (2) the resource is currently harvested at
an estimated maximum sustainable yield and can be considered

Leased quota
Own quota

N

Mean

SD

Median

IQR

1960
2412

72.79
80.58

39.79
54.25

56.00
64.00

45.20
55.45

stable between trips; (3) the time-frame for comparison is a matter
of days which reduces other confounding effects.
From 1992 to 1999, a total of 4372 ﬁshing trips were reported, of
which 45% used leased quota. The mean harvest rate (in bushels per
hour) for trips with own quota is 11% higher than for trips with
leased quota (see Table 2). In addition to having a higher mean and
median, the harvest rate of trips with own quota displayed greater
variability than for trips with leased quota (standard deviation of
54.25 compared to 39.79 bushels per hour and interquartile range
(IQR) of 55.45 and 45.20). The period with the greatest deviation
between harvest rates was 1996–1999, when the mean harvest
rates of trips with owned quota were 29% higher than for trips with
leased quota.
Fig. 2 shows that harvest rates for trips using own quota
overtook rates for trips using leased quota in 1994, the year by
which a majority of boat owners had adopted the new share system
(where quota costs are subtracted from gross revenues before
sharing with crew). From then through 1999, mean harvest rates
using the boat owner’s own quota were always higher than mean
harvest rates using quota leased from the quota owner. From 1992
to 1993, before the general adoption of the new contracting system,
harvest rates using own quota were actually lower than those using
leased quota. This preliminary result is consistent with the
prediction in Section 3 that effort levels will be higher for trips
using own quota than for trips using leased quota.
We used a paired t-test to verify that these differences between
mean harvest rates are statistically signiﬁcant, pooling all data from
1994 to 1999. There are a total of nine vessels that harvest in each
year from 1994 to 1999 using both own and leased quotas
(in different trips). By matching the mean harvest rate of both types
of trips based on the individual vessel, we rejected the null
hypothesis that mean harvest rates for the two types of trips are
equal (t-value ¼ 2.78) at 5% signiﬁcance level. It is important to
clarify that these changes are independent of a recent population
decline in the southern range of the surf clam habitat. The period of
decline was 1999–2002 and has been attributed to warmer waters
in this region [33]. We do not believe that this decline affects our
results for two reasons. First, our analysis is focused on the period
prior to the decline (1994–1999). Second, to test our hypothesis of
difference in rate of harvest for trips with leased versus owned
quotas, we are interested in variation between trip types, rather
than the changes over time.

Mean harvest rate
(bushels/hour)

Table 1
Change in payment to vessel crew, 1992–1999
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Fig. 2. Annual mean harvest rate by ITQ ownership.
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5.3. Regression results
The previous section showed that the mean harvest rate of trips
with own quota tends to be higher than that with leased quota. Our
regression analysis includes trips of the 17 vessels owned by ﬁrms
that both leased and owned quota from 1992 to 1999 (n ¼ 2797).
Results are reported in Table 3. The dependent variable is the
harvest rate (bushels of surf clams per hour). Explanatory variables
include an indicator for trips with quota that are owned by the boat
owner and for which the crew receives the full 1/3 share of the
revenue, dummy variables for season the trip was taken and
a dummy variable for each of the vessels in the sample. The dummy
variable for the vessel captures the difference in the harvest rate
due to differences in the capital (e.g. age and size of vessel), any
geographical variation in surf clam abundance near the vessel’s
primary port and skill of the captain. To preserve conﬁdentiality the
boat identiﬁers are suppressed: instead we differentiate the vessels
by dummy variables for the 17 active vessels (randomly assigned).
The base case is harvests in the winter with leased quota by vessel
17. The model as a whole is statistically signiﬁcant (F-statistic
equals 164.32) and explains more than half of the observed
variation in the harvest rate (adjusted R-square is 0.5388). There
was no signiﬁcant change in the stock of surf clams over the period
of interest [33].
The coefﬁcient for trips taken with quota owned by the boat
owner (‘‘own’’) is 5.42 and is statistically signiﬁcant (p-value ¼
0.003). On average, trips taken with quota owned have a harvest
rate that is 5.42 bushels per hour greater than trips with leased
quota. To put this value in context, consider the fact that these
results indicate that the difference in harvest rates between trips
with owned versus leased quota is slightly larger than the difference in harvest rates between winter and fall, and substantially
greater than the difference in harvest rates between winter and
spring or summer. Furthermore, for the 17 vessels in these data the
difference in harvest rates between trips with owned quota and the
harvest rate on leased trips ranges from a minimum of 2.8% to
a maximum of 19.4% and has a mean of 8%. In other words, on
average the trips with owned quota had a harvest rate that was
almost 8% higher than those trips with leased quota. This result
provides substantial empirical support for the prediction of our

6. Summary and conclusions
In evaluating alternative regulatory approaches to ﬁsheries, it is
critical to consider all of the ways in which industry participants
will adapt to regulatory change. This paper provides a mathematical model to explain the contracting relationships under ITQs and
subsequent effort levels in a ﬁshery by presenting an economic
model and then testing this model in the Mid-Atlantic surf clam
ﬁshery.
Under ITQs, when boat owner, quota owner, and crew are risk
averse in a stochastic environment, share contracts between crew
and boat owners and share contracts between quota owners and
boat owners are economically rational. In addition, boat owners can
defray the cost of leasing ITQs by sharing this cost with the crew,
while still meeting the crew’s participation constraint. Under these
types of contracts, where the cost of leasing quota is shared
between boat owner and crew, the crew will expend a lower effort
level than on trips where the quota is owned outright by the boat
owner. The consequence of this hidden action is observable as
a higher harvest rate for trips using the boat owner’s own quota
than for trips using leased quota, as conﬁrmed by an analysis of the
surf clam ﬁshery.
Environmental regulations using market incentives, such as
ITQs, are increasingly popular internationally. As described in this
paper, the persistence and form of share contracts under these
policies could have important implications for the labor sector.
Appendix

Negotiation of contract
The optimization problem in this contract is for the boat owner
to maximize his utility subject to the participation constraints of
both quota owner and crew. That is, maximize

Ub ¼ E½Ib   bb Var½Ib  ¼ ð1  rÞ½PH  aPðH  qb Þ
qðH  qb Þ  FC  ð1  rÞ2 ð1  aÞ2 P 2 H2 bb s2m

Table 3
Regression results
Variable

model, on trips with leased quota the crew share the cost of leasing
the quota and in response select a lower effort. The observable
outcome of lower effort level is a lower harvest rate.

subject to :
Coefﬁcient

Standard error

P-value

Constant**
Own**
Spring
Summer
Fall*

28.01
5.42
1.07
0.09
5.21

4.15
1.79
2.16
2.10
2.05

0.000
0.003
0.621
0.965
0.011

Boat effects
Boat 1**
Boat 2**
Boat 3**
Boat 4**
Boat 5**
Boat 6**
Boat 7**
Boat 8**
Boat 9**
Boat 10**
Boat 11**
Boat 12**
Boat 13**
Boat 14**
Boat 15**
Boat 16**

97.12
21.07
52.22
18.55
75.47
49.23
25.30
81.14
41.23
11.43
64.20
163.62
58.81
88.21
48.83
57.61

6.11
5.98
4.38
4.62
3.64
5.86
3.63
4.58
4.75
5.36
4.51
4.15
4.56
6.90
5.11
8.00

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.033
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

*Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.

U q ¼ dMðH  qb Þ ¼ aPðH  qb Þ þ qðH  qb Þ  a2 P 2 H2 bq s2m
0aPðH  qb Þ þ qðH  qb Þ ¼ a2 P 2 H2 bq s2m þ dMðH  qb Þ ðaÞ
The expected value of the quota owner’s return from leasing his
quota must be sufﬁcient to compensate him for the return he would
obtain by selling the quota, plus the risk associated with the
uncertain output. The utility function for the crew is

U c ¼ WL ¼ r½PH  aPðH qb Þ qðH qb Þr 2 ð1 aÞ2 P 2 H 2 bc s2m
0r½PH  aPðH qb Þ qðH qb Þ ¼ r 2 ð1 aÞ2 P 2 H2 bc s2m þWL
(b)
The expected value of the crew’s return from joining the ﬁshing
trip must be sufﬁcient to compensate them for their opportunity
cost (the wage in next best employment), plus the risk associated
with the uncertain output.
There are four choice variables in this case: effort level (L), ﬁxed
rental price of quota (q), crew share of revenue and variable cost of
crew (r), and share of the output price of quota owner (a).
Substituting constraints (a) and (b) into the boat owner’s utility
function, we get

Ub ¼ PH  a2 P 2 H2 bq s2m  dMðH  qb Þ  r 2 ð1  aÞ2
P 2 H 2 bc s2m

2

 WL  FC  ð1  rÞ ð1 

aÞ2 P 2 H2 b

The second-order condition is

s2

b m

0Ub ¼ PH  dMðH  qb Þ  WL  FC  P 2 H 2
h
i
s2m a2 bq þ r2 ð1  aÞ2 bc þ ð1  rÞ2 ð1  aÞ2 bb
The value of a and r that maximizes Ub will be the solution to:



VLL ¼ PHLL  dMHLL  2kP 2 HL2 þ HHLL <0
By the implicit function theorem, we can solve the ﬁrst-order condition to get the explicit expression of choice variable L*(k, P, M, W, d).
Differentiate the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to k, we
then get

Min D ¼ a2 bq þ r 2 ð1  aÞ2 bc þ ð1  rÞ2 ð1  aÞ2 bb
Differentiate D with respect to a to get the ﬁrst-order condition:

vD
¼ 2abq  2ð1  aÞr 2 bc  2ð1  aÞð1  rÞ2 bb ¼ 0
va
h
i
0a bq þ r 2 bc þ ð1  rÞ2 bb ¼ r 2 bc þ ð1  rÞ2 bb
0a* ¼

r 2 bc þ ð1  rÞ2 bb

bq þ r2 bc þ ð1  rÞ2 bb

PHLL

vL*
vL*
vL*
vL*
 dMHLL
 2P 2 HHL  2kP 2 HL2
 2kP 2 HHLL
¼0
vk
vk
vk
vk

vL*
2P 2 HHL


¼
0
vk PH  dMH  2kP 2 H2 þ HH
LL
LL
LL
L
By the second-order condition, the denominator is less than zero.
We then could sign it as

Differentiate D with respect to r to get the other ﬁrst-order
condition:

vL*
0
<0
vk

vD
¼ 2r bc  2ð1  rÞbb ¼ 0
vr

Since k is an increasing function of a*, the optimal employment and
output level for a boat owner will be smaller when he faces output
price sharing quota leasing than the situation when he faces the
ﬁxed rental price quota leasing.

0r * ¼

bb
bb þ bc

Our result shows that the optimal choice of share value between
boat owner and crew member under ITQs is the same as the general
result documented by Plourde and Smith [27]. Note that the
optimal parameter r* will be independent of market variables such
as wage, price, and employment [27].
Substitute r* ¼ bb/(bb þ bc) back into a* to get

a* ¼

r 2 bc þ ð1  rÞ2 bb

bq þ

r2 b

c

2

þ ð1  rÞ bb

¼

bb bc
bq ðbb þ bc Þ þ bb bc

From this expression, we notice that a* is always between 0 and 1.
It is equal to 0 if and only if bb or bc is zero – in another words,
when boat owner or crew member is risk neutral. Since we have
assumed that both of them are risk averse, a* will not be zero. This
means that whenever production is feasible, a share contract
between boat owner and quota owner is optimal. Note that the
optimal share parameter a* is also independent of market variables
such as output price and effort level; it is purely determined by the
risk aversion parameters of boat owner, crew member and quota
owner.
Substitute r* ¼ bb/(bb þ bc) and a* ¼ bbbc/(bq(bb þ bc) þ bbbc)
back into the objective function of D to get the minimum value of D.
Through simple mathematical manipulation, we can get

D* ¼ bq a*
Substitute D* ¼ bqa* back into boat owner’s utility function to get

Ub ¼ PH  dMðH  qb Þ  WL  FC  P 2 H2 s2m D*
¼ PH  dMðH  qb Þ  WL  FC  P 2 H2 s2m bq a*
Let s2m bq a* ¼ k, the objective function now becomes

MaxL Ub ¼ PH  dMðH  qb Þ  WL  FC  P 2 H 2 s2m D*
¼ PH  dMðH  qb Þ  WL  FC  kP 2 H 2
Differentiate Ub with respect to L to get the ﬁrst-order condition:

VL ¼ PHL  dMHl  W  2kP 2 HHL ¼ 0
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